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As eyewitness memory and its current admissibility as evidence in courts have come 
under scrutiny, numerous studies have examined variables that affect eyewitness 
memory. These variables are divided into system and estimator variables. System 
variables are factors that can be controlled by the criminal justice system; estimator 
variables are those which cannot be controlled by the justice system. Considerable 
research has demonstrated that stress can either inhibit or enhance memory depending 
on the level of arousal. This literature review will examine the role and effect of stress 
in general and in regard to other estimator variables (e.g., seriousness, weapons focus, 
and victim vs. bystander). Both field and laboratory studies will be examined. General 
trends, important caveats, and limitations will be reported. Despite the breadth of 
research in both eyewitness research and stress and memory, there is no recent 
comprehensive review of the effect of stress on eyewitness memory. This literature 
review will serve to bridge that gap and provide resources for those looking to continue 
research in the area of stress and eyewitness memory. 
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 Introduction 
Eyewitnesses to a crime may experience extremely high levels of stress, making it 
important to understand stress’ effects on a person’s ability to recall information. This 
document summarizes this stress-memory literature for eyewitnesses. 
This paper is divided into five sections: The Eyewitness Testimony Problem, 
General Background, The Effects of Stress on Eyewitness Memory, Amelioration, and 
Conclusion. In the first section, general problems with eyewitness testimony are 
discussed in order to contextualize the need for eyewitness scrutiny. This includes 
statistics of testimony use, error, and impact as well as descriptions of other common 
memory issues that eyewitnesses may experience. The General Background section 
contains an overview of memory processes and the nature of stress. Understanding 
these concepts is vital to understanding the core purpose and research in this paper. The 
next section, The Effects of Stress on Eyewitness Memory, will go into the heart of 
eyewitness stress literature. The Amelioration section will discuss ways of accounting 
for system variables when handling eyewitnesses. The conclusion will summarize the 
paper’s findings and provide general opinions on how use the data on eyewitness 
memory. 
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The Eyewitness Testimony Problem 
Number of Cases in Which Eyewitness Testimony Is a Problem 
Eyewitness testimony is used in a large number of cases and is responsible for 
many false convictions. In the United States, approximately 75,000 defendants are 
implicated by eyewitnesses annually (Department of Justice, 1999). Inaccurate 
eyewitness testimony accounts for more wrongful convictions than do false confessions, 
problems with informants, and defective or fraudulent science combined (Innocence 
Project, 2005). 
Known Cases of Misidentification 
Of the first 150 people exonerated by DNA evidence, 70% had been incorrectly 
identified by an eyewitness (Innocence Project, 2005). Of the 1,905 exonerations listed 
in the National Registry of Exonerations database, 573 (30%) involved instances of 
eyewitness misidentification. Of the 333 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the 
United States, more than 70% of them involved eyewitness misidentification ("DNA 
Exonerations Nationwide," 2015; "Eyewitness Misidentification," Innocence Project).  
Warden (2001) examined 86 death row cases that contained a post-conviction 
exoneration. Eyewitness identification played a role in 46 of the 86 (53.5%) of the 
improper convictions. In 33 (38.4%) of the cases, eyewitness testimony was the sole 
form of evidence. 
An Unknown Failure Rate for Eyewitness Identifications 
The above data demonstrate that problems in eyewitness identifications have 
contributed to numerous improper convictions. However, the true number of 
misidentifications (i.e. false positives; incorrectly identifying someone as the offender 
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when he or she is innocent) made by witnesses remains unknown. DNA evidence exists 
for only a small number of cases, so it is likely that there are many people who have 
been misidentified and inappropriately convicted of crimes and will never be 
exonerated.  
Furthermore, eyewitnesses can be inaccurate by failing to identify a perpetrator 
(i.e. false negatives; incorrectly failing to identify a perpetrator). The rate of these false 
negatives is also unknown. Police do not keep systematic statistics regarding the 
number of instances in which an eyewitness could have identified a perpetrator but 
failed. 
The Unreliability and Malleability of Memory 
 Memory is malleable. For example, imagining an event can cause people to 
create “memories” of it, even if the situation is unrealistic or impossible (Mazzoni & 
Memon, 2003). In one case, Braun, Ellis and Loftus (2002) used fake advertisements to 
convince participants that they had met and shaken hands with Bugs Bunny at a Disney 
resort as a child. Bugs Bunny is the property of Warner Bros., not Disney, and would 
not have been on Disney property. Despite that, 16% of the people who saw the Bugs 
Bunny advertisement believed that the event had happened to them. 
 Similarly, people may confuse imagination with fact and misremember the 
source of conjured images when interrogators ask people to imagine a crime scene 
(Henkel & Coffman, 2004). Imagination can even lead people to believe they are guilty 
of a crime they did not commit—but those cases usually involve improper interrogation 
techniques focusing on events that are easy to imagine, contain vivid details, and lack 
context on how the original memory formed (Henkel & Coffman, 2004).  
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Sometimes, eyewitnesses will experience unconscious transference — they will 
misidentify an individual who is unconsciously familiar to them as the perpetrator of a 
crime. This was the case in 1988 when Leslie Dunn, a Los Angeles judge, was attacked 
while jogging. Dunn picked Stephen Weible out of a police photobook and identified 
him as her attacker. However, Weible did not match the description of the perpetrator 
that she had given to the police immediately after the attack. Dunn was familiar with 
Weible. Four years prior, she had sentenced Weible in her own courtroom for a similar 
crime, a fact she had failed to recall on her own (Lerner, 1988). Even though Dunn said 
in court that she could “never erase his face [as her assailant] from her memory,” the 
case was eventually dismissed due to a lack of evidence (“Local News in Brief,” 1988). 
In a study of unconscious transference, Ross, Ceci, Dunning, and Toglia (1994) 
found that people were three-times more likely to misidentify an innocent bystander as 
a perpetrator after watching footage of a bank robbery compared to participants in a 
control group without an innocent bystander. The chance of inaccurate memory was 
only eliminated in the transference group when participants were informed that the 
person they identified (the bystander) and perpetrator were not the same person. After 
receiving that cue, participants could recall where they had seen the bystander’s face, 
but without that cue they would have implicated the wrong person. 
When it comes to identifying a suspect in a line-up, relative judgment can also 
affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. Using relative judgment, eyewitnesses 
will unconsciously choose the person most similar to the perpetrator if the perpetrator is 
not present in the line-up (Wells, 1984; 1993). In these cases, witnesses do not know a 
face well enough to determine if it is absent from a line-up. 
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People are particularly poor at identifying members of a different race. A meta-
analysis found that people are 1.4 times more likely to correctly identify a same-race 
face than an other-race face and are 1.56 times more likely to misidentify an other-race 
face than a same-race face (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). People are better at identifying 
those of the same race due to attentional resource allocation (see: Mechanisms of 
Memory section). Attentional resources directed toward features that distinguish 
members of within-race (e.g. eye color) may not be useful for distinguishing member of 
other-races (Sporer, 2001). However, most crime happens within race (Wells & Olson, 
2001). 
Juries Believe Eyewitnesses Regardless of Accuracy 
In a study that examined the power of eyewitness testimony, mock jurors heard 
an armed bank robbery case which resulted in two deaths (Loftus, 1975). The case had 
circumstantial evidence. Without eyewitness testimony, 18% of jurors convicted him. 
When eyewitness testimony was added, 72% of jurors convicted him. Even in 
conditions in which the eyewitness was discredited, 68% of jurors still voted for 
conviction. 
The significantly higher conviction rate in Loftus (1975) is evidence for the 
widely held belief in the field that eyewitness testimony is the single most persuasive 
piece of evidence for juries—as well as the least reliable (Wells, Small, Penrod, 
Malpass, Fulero, Brimacombe, 1998). 
The case of Calvin C. Johnson Jr. is an example of how convincing 
eyewitnesses are for juries. Johnson served 16 years in prison for a rape he did not 
commit. He had multiple alibis and, under a microscope, his hair did not match the one 
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found at the scene of the rape. The case hinged on the victim picking his photo out of a 
photo-spread (she had failed to pick him out of a live line-up). However, a separate rape 
victim who had been attacked around the same time and in a similar manner had 
identified Johnson in a line-up, but had failed to choose him in a photo-spread. The jury 
deliberated for only 45 minutes before convicting him (Firestone, 1999; “Calvin 
Johnson,” Innocence Project). For Johnson, a DNA comparison to the semen on a 
vaginal swab from the rape victim freed him after more than a decade of incarceration. 
Confidence effects. Witnesses’ confidence in the accuracy of their 
identifications is not strongly correlated with accuracy (Garry & Polaschek, 2000; 
Sporer, Penrod, Read & Cutler, 1995; Leippe, 1980; Hosch, Leippe, Marchioni & 
Cooper, 1984; Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Buckhout, 1974). Although some studies have 
found a weak correlation between confidence and accuracy, it is too small to have any 
practical applicability. Additionally, people who are trained to recognize faces and are 
confident in that ability do not show significantly better accuracy than untrained people 
(Woodhead, Baddeley & Simmonds, 1979). 
System and Estimator Variables  
There are many factors that can alter eyewitness memory. These factors can be 
sorted into two groups: system variables and estimator variables. System variables are 
controllable. Often they can be moderated by the criminal justice system or other  
professionals involved in the case. Examples of system variables are: the use of leading 
questions during interviews, giving praise or punishment during suspect identification 
procedures, and the methods used in creating line-ups. On the other hand, estimator 
variables (i.e., situational factors) are out of the criminal justice system’s control. These 
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factors cannot be changed, but can be accounted for when evaluating eyewitness 
credibility (see: Amelioration section). Examples of estimator variables are: how dark it 
was during the event or visibility in general, sleep deprivation of the witness, stress 
level of the witness, duration of the crime and if there was a weapon present. This 
literature review will focus on stress as an estimator variable. Many of the effects of 
other estimator variables (e.g., weapon presence, being a victim versus bystander, crime 
seriousness, etc.) are affected by stress.  
 
General Background 
Mechanisms of Memory 
Attention. Attention refers to mental concentration on a specific aspect of the 
environment within a perceptive field. Jonides (1983) relates the brain’s attentional 
ability as “analogous to the body’s eye.” Information inside the “focus” of attention, is 
intensely processed; whereas information outside of this area (i.e., in the periphery) is 
subject to much less processing. Biologically, Eriksen and Hoffman (1972) specifically 
found one area of the visual field where optical acuity is at its best (about 1 degree in 
size) where information is processed in high-resolution and precise detail. Information 
outside of that region was encoded less-distinctly and as a “vague indefinite 
background” both spatially and in regards to how attentional resources were allocated. 
As more attentional resources are focused on stimulus within the area receiving more 
processing power, other information within the perceptive field will be tuned out. 
Perception. Perception is a low-level form of sensory information processing 
that primarily occurs on an unconscious level. It includes recognizing shapes as certain 
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objects, having light hit the retina at a particular wavelength to produce the appearance 
of color, and recognizing certain patterns as a face. Perception can be changed through 
non-sensory means such as our pre-existing knowledge, expectations, and emotions; 
those non-sensory factors can cause people to interpret what they see in a way 
differently from others (Coon & Mitterer, 2010). For example, people with aggressive 
tendencies were quicker to identify aggression in pictures than people with low 
aggressive tendencies (Forest, 1962 qtd. in Hardy & Heyes, 1999). In a real-life 
scenario, that might mean one witness would recall a perpetrator as aggressive while 
another would not. 
 Encoding. Memory encoding is when sensory information is converted into a 
form that can be stored in the brain. During this process, new information is weaved 
together with previous, related information to form one, collective informational pool. 
 Working memory. Working memory refers to short-term limited-capacity 
memory mechanisms that can hold encoded information for limited amounts of time so 
that it can be manipulated. There are four systems to working memory: the central 
executive, the visualspatial sketchpad, the phonological loop and the episodic buffer 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2000). The systems are shown in the figure below 
and their roles are explained in the subsequent paragraph. 
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The central executive has a few functions. It directs information to its specific 
“slave” systems, controls which system gets attention, and shifts between processing  
information and retrieving it. The visualspatial sketchpad processes visual and spatial 
information while the phonological loop processes auditory information (e.g. speech, 
sounds). Both the visualspatial sketchpad and phonological loop have limited working 
capacities and they can work simultaneously without interfering with each other. Even 
if one system of working memory (visual or auditory processing) has reached its 
capacity, the other can still handle information. 
The episodic buffer acts as a temporary “back-up” store for information 
(Baddeley, 2000). It has a limited capacity and contains a mix of visual and auditory 
information. It is primarily discussed in reference to amnesia patients who are unable to 
encode information to long-term memory, but can briefly remember episodic 
information past the normal working capacity of the phonological loop or visualspatial 
sketchpad.  
  
Figure 1. Working memory processes (Baddeley, 2000). The 
central executive directs information to the visuospatial 
sketchpad, phonological loop or episodic buffer. 
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Long-term memory. Long-term memory is comprised of information that can 
be remembered for extended periods of time without rehearsal. Rehearsal and retrieval 
can cement a piece of information’s place in long-term memory, but information can 
still reside for years in long-term memory without retrieval. 
Some information will transfer automatically to long-term memory from 
working memory (as in the case of incidental learning), but information’s transfer is 
typically dependent on control processes (e.g. attention and rehearsal) being devoted to 
the information (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Rehearsal is especially important for 
information in the phonological loop. Verbal information is lost within a few seconds 
without rehearsal (Baddeley, 2000).  
Retrieval. Retrieval, or remembering, is when information is pulled out of 
storage for recall. Retrieval is both the beginning and end of the memory cycle. After 
information is recalled, it is re-encoded and stored in order to be retrieved at a later date. 
Each memory changes slightly every time it is retrieved. During the retrieval process, 
the brain takes the context of its retrieval into account and weaves it into the original 
memory itself. Therefore, when information is re-encoded, the context of the last 
retrieval will be encoded and stored along with the original memory; the context and the 
memory fuse together to form one “new” memory, changing how it will be remembered 
next time it is retrieved. 
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Stress 
 According to the American Psychological Association, stress is “the pattern of 
specific and nonspecific responses an organism makes to stimulus events that disturb its 
equilibrium and tax or exceed its ability to cope.” Stress is a psychological and 
physiological reaction to a stimulus and a form of arousal. It has been operationalized in 
different ways. Researchers have used heart rate measures, heart rate variability (HRV), 
electrodermal activity, cortisol levels, and other indicators as physiological markers of 
stress. Various psychological measures including self-report measures have also been 
used. 
 Effects of stress on performance. Based upon the research of Yerkes and 
Dodson (1908), the Yerkes-Dodson law describes an inverted-U relation between 
arousal and performance. It is shown below. In general, small amounts of arousal 
increase performance. However, after a certain point, arousal levels go past optimal 
levels and performance decreases. 
Figure 2. Yerkes-Dodson curve as shown in Diamond (2005). The point of optimal 
arousal for performance exists at the center of the graph. Performance goes down as 
arousal exceeds that point. 
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The model is a rough practical approximation of what happens under varying 
levels of arousal. It does not differentiate between types of arousal and very few studies 
elicit varying levels of arousal in their participants to see how their performance 
changes on various points of the curve, but it is still useful in understanding how arousal 
can affect performance.  
 The Yerkes-Dodson model is relevant to eyewitness memory because 
eyewitnesses of a crime, whether as a victim or as a bystander, are typically subjected to 
extreme amounts of stress and then are asked to perform a difficult task—recalling 
details of a crime as accurately as possible despite many factors potentially dividing 
their attention when the event occurred. This causes eyewitnesses to fall to the right of 
the curve’s point of optimal arousal; the eyewitness’ performance ability is harmed. 
 
Effects of Stress on Eyewitness Memory 
High Stress Effects Due to Fear 
For eyewitnesses, high stress levels are typically due to fear—whether it is fear 
for their well-being or the well-being of others. There are two main effects of high-
stress in eyewitness: decreased encoding of information in general and a narrowing of 
attention to specific stimuli. 
 Decreased encoding as stress increases. When eyewitnesses experience high 
levels of stress, their memory function decreases as their focus shifts to preservation of 
their well-being instead of processing fine details. Shown in the table below, witnesses 
of violent events tend to have greater levels of memory disruption. Studies that 
13 
 
measured memory disruption effects using field studies or a staged event found stronger 
evidence for the relation than laboratory studies or those without a staged event. 
 
Researcher Type Witness Stressor Brief findings 
Kuehn (1974) Field Real 
victims of 
crimes 
Being an actual 
victim 
Increased violence correlated with 
increased memory disruption 
Clifford & Scott 
(1978) 
Lab Civilians Violent videos Memory was worse in the violent 
video condition; effect stronger in 
women 
Leippe, Wells, & 
Ostrom (1978) 
Lab Civilians Watching a theft 
of a calculator or 
cigarettes 
Increased accurate identification 
rate if they knew worth of stolen 
valuable object before the crime 
Clifford & Hollin 
(1981) 
Lab Civilians Violent videos; 
increased 
number of 
menacing people 
Memory was worse in the violent 
video condition. Memory was 
worse as number of men 
increased 
Hosch & Cooper 
(1982) 
Lab Civilians Victim of theft 
of a valuable 
object 
Being a victim had a null effect 
on recall 
Hosch, Leippe, 
Marchioni, & Cooper 
(1984) 
Lab Civilians Victim of theft 
of a valuable 
object 
Being a victim had a null effect 
on recall 
Christianson & 
Hubinette (1993) 
Field Real 
witnesses 
of crimes 
Being present 
during a bank 
robbery 
Victims of the robberies had 
better recall than bystanders 
Stanny & Johnson, 
exp. 1 (2000) 
Lab Police Armed suspect 
with hostage 
Increased violence correlated with 
increased memory disruption 
Stanny & Johnson, 
exp. 2 (2000) 
Lab Police, 
Civilians 
Armed suspect 
with hostage or 
in an argument 
Increased violence correlated with 
increased memory disruption; 
officer performance was not 
better than civilian performance 
Deffenbacher, 
Bornstein, Penrod, & 
McGorty (2004)  
Meta-
analysis 
Varies Varies High-stress studies with a staged 
crime produced twice the effect 
size than those without 
Morgan et al. (2004) Field Military 
personnel 
Physical 
interrogation 
Increased violence correlated with 
increased memory disruption 
Valentine & Masout 
(2009) 
Field Civilians A “scary 
person” 
Increased fear correlated with 
increased memory disruption 
Hope et al. (2016) Field Police 
officers 
Armed suspect 
with a hostage 
Increased stress correlated with 
increased memory disruption 
Table 1. The studies discussed in this section that pertain to the effect of decreased 
encoding as stress increases. 
 
14 
 
Field studies. A benefit to a field study of eyewitness stress is that it creates a 
more realistic setting for participants and the effects produced are more likely to reflect 
reality. In one study, Kuehn (1974) analyzed real cases to determine if memory 
degraded as stress reached high levels. He examined the police reports of 2 homicide 
victims (taken before the victim died), 22 rapes, 15 assaults, and 61 robberies to see 
how much and what kind of information was reported for each type of crime. Kuehn 
found that victims reported more information in less-serious crimes compared to serious 
ones. Specifically, more details were given by robbery victims compared to rape or 
assault victims, and injured victims provided less information than their non-injured 
counterparts regardless of crime. Reported information was not checked for accuracy. 
Kuehn also found an effect of sex of the eyewitness. Injured males recalled more 
details than injured females. Kuehn states that more research is needed to know why 
females in a violent situation recall less about the perpetrator, but he suggested that 
females may feel more “fearful, vulnerable, and less capable” in violent encounters. 
Also, female victims experience a higher, constant threat of being raped in any crime 
compared to men, which could increase the level of fear aroused in female witnesses 
and produce a failure to recall details as a side-effect of attempting to “ward off 
subsequent exposure to the anxiety-arousing content” (Janis & Feshbach, 1953). 
Another study recreated the realistic high-intensity stress that a prisoner of war 
may experience and found a significant effect of stress on memory. Morgan et al. 
(2004) found that participants under high-stress conditions were significantly less likely 
to identify their interrogators. Researchers placed participants on the receiving end of 
two interrogations: a low-stress interrogation and a high-stress interrogation. Following 
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the interrogations, the participants were asked to identify their interrogators. Regardless 
of the way their interrogator was presented in a line-up, participants in the high-stress 
condition were less likely to correctly identify their interrogator.  
The participants in Morgan et al. (2004) were 509 active military personnel 
enrolled in survival school training; no new or inexperienced personnel participated. 
Participants were placed in a mock prisoner of war camp (POWC) after 48 hours of 
sleep and food deprivation. Twelve hours after being placed in the POWC, they 
experienced the first of two 40-minute interrogations. One interrogation was “high-
stress” (involving physical confrontation) and the other was “low-stress” (no physical 
confrontation, but with interrogators trying to “trick” participants into giving 
information). (Note: Researchers could not elaborate on what constituted “real 
physical confrontation” due to details of the survival school course being classified, but 
asserted that the experience in a POWC was meant to be “highly realistic.”) Four hours 
after their first interrogation, they experienced their second. Twenty-four hours after the 
interrogations were complete, participants received either a photo line-up or a live line-
up to identify their interrogator. For 20% of the participants, the interrogator was not 
present in the line-up.  
The table below shows performance data in Morgan et al. (2004). In the high 
stress condition, participants made fewer true positive identifications (accurately 
identifying their interrogator when the interrogator was present), more false positive 
identifications (saying someone was the interrogator when the real interrogator was 
absent), fewer false negative identifications (saying the interrogator was absent when 
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the interrogator was present), and more true negative identifications (saying the 
interrogator was absent when the interrogator was absent). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of assessment Stress condition  
High Low 
True positive responses   
    Live line-up method 40/150 (30%) 113/182 (62%)a 
    Photo spread method 33/98 (34%) 70/92 (76%) 
    Sequential photo method 20/42 (49%)b 42/55 (76%) 
True negative responses   
    Live line-up method 21/38 (55%) 23/46 (50%) 
    Photo spread method 12/23 (52%) 9/23 (39%) 
    Sequential photo method 10/10 (100%)c 12/12 (100%)d 
False positive responses   
    Live line-up method 105/188 (56%) 87/228 (38%) 
    Photo spread method 77/114 (68%) 14/114 (12%)e 
    Sequential photo method 26/51 (51%)f 16/64 (25%) 
False negative responses   
    Live line-up method 0/150 (0%) 5/182 (3%) 
    Photo spread method 0/91 (0%) 15/24 (61%)g 
    Sequential photo method 0/41 (0%) 0/56 (0%) 
Chi-square analyses to compare the methods within a condition (high stress, low stress) and 
not between the two conditions. 
     a Method elicited significantly fewer true positive responses within the low-stress 
condition (X2=7.5; df= 2; P<.02). 
     b Method elicited significantly more true positive responses within the high-stress 
condition (X2=8.3; df=2; P<.016). 
     c Method elicited significantly more true negative responses within the high-stress 
condition (X2=7.6; df=2; P<.02). 
     d Method elicited significantly more true negative responses within the low-stress 
condition (X2=12.5; df=2; P<.002). 
     e Method elicited significantly fewer false positive responses within the low-stress 
condition (X2=25; df=2; P<.0001). 
     f Trend for false positive responses to be lower within the high-stress condition (X2=5.6; 
df=2; P<.06). 
     g Method elicited significantly more false negative responses within the low-stress 
condition (X2=86; df=2; P<.0001). 
Table 2. Eyewitness recognition across type of assessment within stress conditions (Morgan et al., 2004). 
Participants in the high-stress condition had fewer true positive IDs, more false positive IDs, less false negative IDs, 
and more true negative IDs. 
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Additionally, confidence ratings did not significantly differ between accurate 
and inaccurate IDs in Morgan et al. (2004), implying that confidence level was not an 
indication of accuracy in this case. This study’s finding on confidence levels supports 
those in other studies (e.g., Garry and Polaschek (2000) and Sporer, Penrod, Read and 
Cutler (1995)). 
 In Morgan et al. (2004), both length of exposure to their interrogator’s face and 
previous military experience could have led to a much higher accuracy rate than would 
be expected of typical eyewitnesses. Each interrogation in the study lasted for 
approximately 40 minutes, which is a much longer exposure time to a perpetrator’s face 
than a typical eyewitness would have in a mugging, rape, burglary or assault. Exposure 
duration has a strong positive correlation with ability to identify a perpetrator’s face 
(Shapiro & Penrod, 1986; Memon, Hope & Bull, 2003). Additionally, members of the 
active military may have had previous training in mock-captive or interrogation 
situations and may have experienced less stress than civilian eyewitnesses might 
experience. 
In another study, police officers were put into a mock hostage situation and later 
told to perform recall tasks (Hope et al., 2016). Seventy-six police officers of varying 
rank were paired and placed in heart rate monitors. One officer was designated the 
“Active Officer” and the other was the “Observer Officer.” Both officers watched 
CCTV footage of the events that took place before they arrived. This was the “briefing 
phase.” Afterward, the Active Officer was put into the hostage event role-play, armed 
with a training handgun loaded with blank rounds. The Active Officers were told that 
they were part of an initial response team and that they should “respond…as they would 
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normally in the course of their duty.” This was the “response phase.” During the 
response phase, the Observer Officer could only observe silently. Forty-five to fifty 
minutes after the response phase, the officers underwent recall tasks for both phases. 
 The officers showed no difference in quantity of reported accurate or inaccurate 
information during recall of the briefing phase. In the response phase, the quantity of 
reported inaccurate information did not vary between the two groups; however, as 
shown in the table below, Active Officers “reported significantly fewer correct details 
about the scenario than observer witnesses” during the response phase. 
 
 
 
 
Active Officers Observer Officers 
Mean (SD) 95% CI Mean (SD) 95% CI 
Briefing Phase     
    Correct 47.46 (17.37) [41.97, 52.68] 47.24 (16.01) [42.32, 52.45] 
    Incorrect 4.72 (5.66) [3.16, 6.86] 4.54 (4.21) [3.25, 6.00] 
    Accuracy rate .91 (.08) [.88, .94] .92 (.07) [.90, .94] 
Critical response phase     
    Correct** 38.67 (10.17) [35.61, 41.97] 45.84 (12.59) [42.02, 50.03] 
    Incorrect 1.64 (2.18) [1.00, 2.40] 1.29 (1.05) [.97, 1.66] 
    Accuracy .96 (.04) [.95, .97] .97 (.02) [.96, 98] 
**p < .01. 
 
 
 
Physiological data from heart rate monitors suggest that stress may have 
contributed to the smaller number of correct items recalled by Active Officers compared 
to Observer Officers during the response phase. The Active Officers demonstrated 
significantly higher average maximum heart rates compared to Observer Officers, and 
significantly lower heart rate variability (HRV). Lower HRV is associated with 
increased stress (Thayer et al., 2012). The physiological and recall performance in Hope 
Table 3.  Means, SDs, and 95% Confidence Intervals for Correct and Incorrect Items Reported and Accuracy Rate by 
Experimental Goup (Hope et al., 2016). Active officers differed significantly from observer officers in the number of 
correct details about the response phase. 
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et al. (2016) indicates that the increased stress of being engaged in a high-risk situation 
negatively impacts memory functioning in police officers. Also, these effects were not 
mediated by rank within the police force, so stress levels and memory performance 
cannot be attributed to lack of experience. 
In another field study of the effects of fear on memory, Valentine & Masout 
(2009) had participants walk through the Horror Labyrinth of the London Dungeon 
while wearing heart rate monitors. While walking through the labyrinth, participants 
encountered a “scary person” who blocked their way, preventing them from proceeding 
further down the path. Approximately 45-minutes after exiting the labyrinth, 
participants were given a questionnaire that asked for details about the “scary person” 
and about their experiences; then, they were shown a photo line-up. People who 
reported a higher state of anxiety remembered fewer correct details, reported more 
incorrect details, and were less likely to identify the scary person in the lineup than 
people who reported lower levels of anxiety. 
Lab studies. A benefit of laboratory studies is that researchers can closely 
control and vary the individual variables affecting stress levels to determine how each 
of these factors affects eyewitness memory. One common way to examine the 
relationship between stress and fear is to examine changes in memory performance as 
the severity or “seriousness” of a crime changes. Seriousness of a crime can refer to 
how dangerous the crime is, the monetary worth of objects that are stolen or damaged, 
or the personal stake one has in the crime (Narby, Cutler & Penrod 1996). 
In a classic study of crime seriousness, Leippe, Wells, and Ostrom (1978) staged 
a robbery of a confederate’s pack of cigarettes or a calculator to see if value of an object 
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would affect a witness’ ability to identify the thief. They found higher accuracy rates of 
identification when the witness knew the item was valuable before it was stolen. If 
witnesses were told that the item was valuable after the crime occurred, the information 
did not impact their ability to identify the perpetrator. In this case, we do not see a 
negative effect on memory because of an insufficient level of witness fear. Witnesses 
were not personally victimized, the theft was not violent in nature, and there was no 
chance of bodily harm. Instead, witnesses likely experienced moderate amounts of 
arousal (increasing their performance) or there was an attention-related effect since the 
witness’ attention was drawn to the object by the confederate before the theft 
occurred—meaning they were more aware of the object as it was being stolen. 
Another way that researchers can induce witness stress is to have participants 
view videotapes and perform recall tasks. Clifford and Scott (1978) showed violent and 
nonviolent videos of an interaction between a police officer and a suspect being 
restrained. They found that recall was significantly much less accurate for the violent 
video compared to the nonviolent one. 
Sex of the witness played a role in recall ability in Clifford and Scott (1978). 
Women performed significantly worse than men in recall of the violent condition 
despite equal performance in the nonviolent condition. This difference in recall rates is 
likely due to higher levels of emotional stress; compared to men, women rated the 
violent condition as significantly more violent. This corroborates Kuehn’s (1974) 
observation of a sex difference in recall rates for violent crimes. 
Clifford and Hollin (1981) ran a similar study to Clifford and Scott (1978) and 
found that witnesses who viewed tapes with violent footage (a man forcibly stealing a 
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woman’s purse) were significantly worse at accurately describing the assailant than 
those who watched the non-violent footage (a man asking a woman for directions). The 
effect became substantially more pronounced as researches increased the number of 
men standing “menacingly” near the female in the violent condition (Clifford & Hollin, 
1981). In the non-violent condition, the increased number of men did not significantly 
impact memory. 
 Clifford and Hollin (1981) attribute the poorer memory performance in the 
violent condition compared to the non-violent condition to the theory that the observed 
violence generates arousal in the witnesses, thereby narrowing their attention to a 
limited amount of information and reducing the amount of information being encoded 
(Easterbrook, 1959; Broadbent, 1971). As for the effect of an increased number of men 
near the victim reducing recall in the violent condition but not in the nonviolent 
condition, Clifford and Hollin defer to Wall (1965) for an explanation. Wall asserted 
that in a “nonviolent setting, witnesses were able to cope with the extra demands on 
attention, perception, and memory as the number of men increased, but in a ‘time of 
stress,’ this ability decreased” (Wall, 1965 qtd. in Clifford & Hollin, 1981). In other 
words, under high stress, attention is narrowed and the capacity of working memory is 
decreased. 
In a separate lab study, Stanny and Johnson (Experiment 1, 2000) ran a 
computerized firearms simulation to test police officers’ recall under various conditions. 
Officers were split into a ‘no-shoot’ or ‘shoot’ scenario and into an active participant or 
observer role. In the no-shoot condition, an officer responded to a domestic disturbance 
situation and encountered a male suspect who reached into his back pocket to remove a 
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gun (barrel down) and set it on the ground before resuming his stance. In the shoot 
condition, an officer responded to an abduction call and encountered a male perpetrator 
holding a knife to a woman’s throat before pulling out a gun and firing once at the 
police officers. Researchers did not find a significant difference in recall between active 
and observer witnesses. 
Stanny and Johnson (Experiment 2, 2000) expanded their first study to measure 
electrodermal response (EDR) and memory differences between police and citizen 
witnesses, gaining physiological data to support the stress-memory link found in their 
first experiment. They also added a “no shoot” abduction scenario and a “shoot” 
domestic disturbance scenario. Both police and civilian witnesses recalled less 
information, reported higher levels of stress and showed higher EDR levels in the shoot 
conditions—showing a strong negative correlation between stress and memory 
performance. Additionally, both police and civilians recalled less accurate details of the 
abduction-shoot condition compared to its domestic disturbance counterpart, which is in 
line with participants rating the abduction-shoot scenario as more violent than the 
domestic disturbance-shoot scenario. Like in Clifford and Hollin (1981) and Clifford 
and Scott (1978), witnessing violent situations increased the amount of fear-related 
emotional distress in witnesses, decreasing their recall ability. 
Caveats and additional discussion. Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod and 
McGorty (2004) found “clear support for the hypothesis that heightened stress has a 
negative impact on eyewitness identification accuracy” in their recent meta-analysis on 
stress and eyewitness memory. These researchers found a mean effect size of -.31 (95% 
CI: -.04 to -.58) for stress across all of the studies in their meta-analysis, showing that 
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stress does have an effect on witness’ ability to recognize faces (Deffenbacher, 
Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 2004). The first table below shows effect sizes for each 
study in the meta-analysis. Effect size of about .2 are considered small effects, about .5 
are considered medium effects, about .8 are considered large effects, about 1.20 are 
considered very large effects, and about 2.0 or greater are considered huge effects 
(Cohen, 1988; Sawilowky, 2009). For table below: the larger the effect size, the worse 
participants did in the stressful condition compared to the alternate condition in their 
study’s facial recognition measure. 
Author Date N Overall (h) TP (h) TA (h) 
Buckhout et al. 1974 48 -3.02 -3.02  
Mueller et al. 1979 96 .04 .04  
Nowicki et al., Exp. 1 1979 93 -.35 -.35  
Bailis & Mueller 1981 120 .13 .13  
Clifford & Hollin 1981 60 -.16 -.16  
Brigham et al. 1983 20 -.46 -.46  
Bothwell et al., Neuroticsa 1987 35 -.74   
Bothwell et al., Stablesa 1987 36 .52   
Cutler et al.  1987 165 -.08   
Tooley, Brigham, Maas, and Bothwell 1987 96 .14 .14  
Peters, TP 1988 106 -.51 -.51  
Peters, TA 1988 106 -.18  -.18 
Maas & Kohnkenb 1989 86 -.43  -.43 
Hosch & Bothwell, Exp. 1a 1990 39 .49   
Kramer et al., Exp. 1b 1990 64 -.58 -.58  
Goodman et al., Exp. 1 1991 18 -.47 -.47  
Goodman et al., Exp. 2 1991 47 -.27 -.27  
Goodman et al., Exp. 3 1991 34 .24 24  
Peters, Exp. 1, TP 1991 36 -.57 -.57  
Peters, Exp. 1, TA 1991 35 -.04  -.04 
Peters, Exp. 2, TP 1991 34 -.61 -.61  
Peters, Exp. 2, TA 1991 33 .32  .32 
Peters, Exp. 3, TP 1991 32 -1.32 -1.32  
Peters, Exp. 3, TA 1991 32 .39  .39 
Peters, Exp. 4a 1991 96 -.12   
Peters, Exp. 1a 1997 64 -.42   
Peters, Exp. 2a 1997 96 -.31   
a Only overall proportion correct reported. 
b Weapon visibility totally confounded with anxiety level; thus reported as a stress effect. 
 
  
Table 3. Identification Accuracy Effect Sizes (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 2004). The larger 
the effect size, the larger the gap is for recall performance between the stressful and alternate condition. 
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In another table below, Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, and McGorty (2004) 
show effect size by type of analysis. It shows that studies with a staged crime (e.g. a 
role-play scenario or watching video footage) produced twice the effect size than those 
that studied the effect of stress on memory without a staged crime in their study. 
Deffenbacher and colleagues’ finding on larger effect size for staged-crime studies is 
congruent with the effects found in the video tape and field studies (Clifford & Hollin, 
1981; Clifford & Scott, 1978; Stanny & Johnson, 2000) discussed in the above section. 
The studies without a staged crime used things such as social anxiety as their type of 
measured stress instead of fear-based stress. Furthermore, the table below shows an 
effect of line-up type on recognition tests. The greatest stress effects on memory for 
faces were found in target-present line-ups instead of target-absent line-ups, a result that 
Deffenbacher and colleagues attribute to stress. In high-stress situations, memory of 
perpetrator appearance would be negatively affected enough that that witness cannot 
make an accurate ID in a target-present line-up—lowering the overall accuracy rate. 
The same high-stress effect would be present in a target-absent line-up, except the 
suspects would only match the general verbal description given by the witness instead 
of the witness’ higher-quality visual memory of the event—making it more likely that a 
witness correctly rejects target presence, maintaining a higher overall accuracy rate. 
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 Effect size 
Type of Analysis h d 
Identification accuracy   
    All tests a -.31  
    All tests b .22  
    TP lineups a -.52  
    TA lineups a .01  
    TP lineups b .37  
    TA lineups b .00  
    Identification paradigm a  -.36  
    Recognition paradigm a  -.10  
    Staged crimes a -.58  
    Other stressors a  -.28  
    Adult witnesses a -.34  
    Child witnesses a -.27  
Recall accuracy   
   All tests  -.31 
   Interrogative recall  -.34 
   Narrative recall  -.20 
   Adult witness  -.44 
   Child witness  -.06 
   Staged crimes  -.45 
   Other stressors  -.16 
a Overall proportion correct, including hit and 
correct rejections rates 
b False alarm rate 
 
In addition to Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, and McGorty (2004) uncovering 
interesting stress effects, researchers in Stanny and Johnson (Exp 2., 2000) were 
surprised by several of their results. Police witnesses reported higher stress levels, had 
significantly more pronounced EDR activity, and rated the shoot-conditions as more 
violent than the civilian witnesses did. Despite that, police did not differ significantly in 
recall accuracy from civilian witnesses even though police recalled a greater quantity of 
information. These researchers hypothesized that police may have a “superior ability” to 
recall witnessed information, but their increased stress levels may mask that effect. As 
for why police officers reported a higher level of stress compared to civilians, the 
authors suggest that police are asked to justify the use of lethal force, their decisions are 
Table 5. Meta-Analysis Effects by Type of Analysis (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 2004). TP and TA 
line-ups refer to target-absent and target-present scenarios. The larger the effect size, the larger the gap is for recall 
performance between the stressful and alternate condition. 
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more heavily scrutinized by the public and by superiors, and they experience continuous 
stress knowing that their performance might be judged (Stanny & Johnson, 2000). Not 
discussed by the researchers is that police officers may also experience a more 
pronounced feeling of a constant, present threat (as discussed with Kuehn, 1974; Janis 
& Feshbach, 1953). Compared to civilians, police training may make officers more 
sensitive to and aware of the danger in an event or, at minimum, understand that there is 
the potential threat of it. This looming threat could increase officers’ stress response 
thereby decreasing their recall ability. 
An alternate explanation for why police remember a larger quantity of details in 
Stanny and Johnson (Exp. 2, 2000) is that police officers are trained to observe and may 
make a point to remember more details of an event compared to a civilian witness who 
may not make that effort. They are not better at it (as shown by the two groups having 
the same accuracy rate); they simply make an effort. Also, a measurement issue could 
explain why the accuracy rate of recalled information for civilians and police did not 
differ despite the physiological data showing significant differences. EDR and heart rate 
are sensitive forms of measurement, whereas general recall tasks are not. It is possible 
that an effect could appear if the performance measurement were more accurate. 
Also worth discussing is the conflicting evidence on whether being a victim-
witness opposed to a bystander-witness changes one’s ability to remember a crime. 
Kuehn (1974) presented strong evidence for degradation of memory as fear increased in 
a victim. Even though there was no bystander group in Kuehn (1974), it seems 
reasonable to assume that the increased fear associated with being a victim instead of a 
bystander would further reduce recall ability. Two studies may offer support for that 
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claim: Hosch, Leippe, Marchioni and Cooper (1984) and Hosch and Cooper (1982). 
Both studies found a null effect of victim-stress on memory, but the researchers may not 
have elicited enough stress in the victim-witnesses for them to differ significantly from 
bystander-witnesses. Researchers had participants witness the theft of a valuable object 
(an expensive watch or calculator sitting on a table) and found that witnessing one’s 
own object being stolen had no impact on memory compared to non-victim witnesses. 
In this case, the lack of memory degradation found in victim-witnesses is likely because 
they did not experience a significantly larger amount of stress compared to bystander-
witnesses. If victims do not differ significantly from bystanders in their level of stress, 
there is no reason to expect a difference in their memory. There was no threat of bodily 
harm or inherent danger associated with the event for either victim- or bystander-
witnesses; witnesses simply watched confederates run out with the belongings that were 
located in a separate part of the room. In fact, the only time in the Hosch studies that 
victims performed more poorly than non-victims was when a victim felt pressure to 
make an identification (Hosch, Leippe, Marchioni, & Cooper, 1984).  
Christianson and Hubinette (1993) found results that appear to directly oppose 
the theory based on Kuehn (1974), but upon further analysis, these results actually 
support Kuehn’s theory. Christianson and Hubinette (1993) studied the memories of 58 
victims and bystanders of 22 separate post office robberies and found that victims had 
more accurate recall than bystanders. After the bank robberies, the victims (tellers with 
a gun pointed at them) and the bystanders (other employees or customers) filled out a 
report detailing their “emotional reactions” as well as details of event as they 
remembered them. The witnesses’ reports were compared to information in police 
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reports to determine accuracy. Christianson and Hubinette found that self-reported 
emotional arousal did not differ significantly between victims and bystanders 
(supporting results in Hosch & Bothwell, 1990). As in Hosch, Leippe, Marchioni, and 
Cooper (1984) and Hosch and Cooper (1982), if emotional arousal does not differ 
between victims and bystanders, there is no reason to suspect that their memory 
performance will differ either. Victims’ better accuracy could be due to position and 
distance. They were closer to the events as they unfolded and may have had a better 
viewing angle.  
There are a few important details to note about Christianson and Hubinette 
(1993) before comparing their results to Kuehn (1974). First, Christianson and 
Hubinette exclusively studied robbery cases. Kuehn examined robberies, but also 
examined cases of rape, assault and homicide. It is possible that Kuehn saw much 
stronger fear-based effects because he was looking at significantly more serious crimes, 
which induced more stress. Also, examining a greater range of crimes would make it 
easier to find effects. Additionally, neither Kuehn nor Christianson and Hubinette 
checked the cases for accuracy, only for quantity of information given. Christianson and 
Hubinette compared testimony to police reports, but there was no way for the 
researchers to analyze the accuracy of the details.  
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Narrowing of attention. In eyewitnesses, observed violence generates arousal, 
thereby narrowing their attention to a limited amount of information—usually the 
stressor—and reducing the amount of information encoded (Easterbrook, 1959; 
Broadbent, 1971). The reduction of encoded information is due to focus being drawn to 
a specific aspect of an event, and less processing being directed toward other details 
(see: Mechanisms of Memory section). 
The table below (which is continued onto the next page) shows the studies that 
will be discussed in this section. The general results are that attention is drawn more 
toward actions and away from specific descriptions and details. Also, attention is drawn 
to unusual, unexpected, or threatening objects. 
 
Researcher Type Witness Stressor Brief findings 
Clifford & Scott 
(1978) 
Lab Civilians Violent videos Actions were recalled more 
frequently than descriptions; effect 
more pronounced in the condition  
Hosch & Cooper 
(1982) 
Lab Civilians Victim of theft 
of a valuable 
object 
Null effects: Attention did not 
narrow to perpetrator’s appearance 
despite absence of weapon or threat 
of bodily harm 
Hosch, Leippe, 
Marchioni, & Cooper 
(1984) 
Lab Civilians Victim of theft 
of a valuable 
object 
Null effects: Attention did not 
narrow to perpetrator’s appearance 
despite absence of weapon or threat 
of bodily harm 
Tooley, Brigham, 
Maas & Bothwell 
(1987) 
Lab Civilians Weapon Weapon presence decreased ability to 
identify a face 
Steblay (1992) Meta-
analysis 
Varies Varies Larger weapon focus effect sizes 
found in studies with a threatening 
object and high stress levels 
Christianson & 
Hubinette (1993) 
Field Real 
witnesses 
of a crime 
Being present 
during a bank 
robbery 
Actions were recalled more 
frequently than descriptions 
Mitchell, Livosky, & 
Mather (1998) 
Lab Civilians Unusual object, 
weapons 
Unusual objects and weapons 
decreased ability to recall 
perpetrator’s appearance 
Shaw & Skolnick 
(1999) 
Lab Civilians Unusual object, 
gun 
Unusual objects decreased ability to 
identify a face; effect more 
pronounced with a gun 
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Pickel (1999) Lab Civilians Gun Gun presence decreased ability to 
recall perpetrator appearance only 
when the gun was unexpected 
Stanny & Johnson, 
exp. 1 (2000) 
Lab Police Gun, knife Perpetrator details were the least 
remembered; actions, victim, and 
weapon details most remembered  
Stanny & Johnson, 
exp. 2 (2000) 
Lab Police, 
Civilians 
Gun, knife Perpetrator details were the least 
remembered; actions, victim, and 
weapon details most remembered 
Pickel, French, & 
Betts (2003) 
Lab Civilians Weapon Weapon presence only affected 
auditory memory retention when it 
contained complex, semantic 
information 
Deffenbacher, 
Bornstein, Penrod, & 
McGorty (2004)  
Meta-
analysis 
Varies Varies High-stress more likely “debilitate” 
memory for human face; results not 
likely to be overturned 
Hope et al. (2016) Field Police 
officers 
Gun Substantial memory corruption for 
weapon-related details 
Table 6. The studies discussed in this section that pertain to the effect of narrowed 
attention. 
 
Lab studies. Clifford and Scott (1978) showed attentional effects in their video 
study in addition to the previously discussed effect of general memory disruption (see: 
Decreased encoding as stress increases section). They found that actions were recalled 
much more frequently than descriptions in both the violent and non-violent videos, but 
the difference was significantly more pronounced in the violent condition (Christianson 
& Hubinette, 1993 found similar results).  
In Stanny and Johnson (Experiments 1 and 2, 2000; see: Decreased encoding 
section) for both shoot and no-shoot scenarios, details of the perpetrator were the least-
remembered type of detail, an effect that increased in the shoot situation. Details of the 
victim, weapon, and actions of the suspect were the most remembered (see: Weapon 
focus section). Police remembered more details of the victim compared to details of the 
perpetrator. This may have occurred because the officers’ focus was drawn to the 
victim. It is the police officer’s job to protect people with as little collateral damage as 
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possible. Using the study’s abduction-shoot scenario as an example, the officers’ focus 
was likely drawn to the state of the woman with a knife to her throat as they closely 
monitored her well-being until she was out of harm’s way. As the officers’ focus “tuned 
in” to the victim and what the weapon was doing in relation to the victim, details of the 
perpetrator faded into the periphery. 
Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, and McGorty (2004) found that when it came 
to remembering necessary details (e.g. perpetrator characteristics, crime scene details, 
and actions of the central characters) as an eyewitness to the crime, “heightened stress is 
much more likely to have a debilitating effect on memory for the human face.” This 
result supports those in Stanny and Johnson (2000) and Clifford and Scott (1978) in that 
attention is drawn away from descriptions, especially the appearance of a perpetrator’s 
face, when a witness is stressed. 
Weapon focus effect. Weapon focus is a special case of narrowed attention with 
the weapon as the stressor. If a weapon is present, attentional resources will be directed 
to the weapon instead of to other details in the environment and those peripheral details 
will not be as accurately encoded, if encoded at all.  
Overall, subjects are much better at identifying a person without a weapon than 
a person who has one (Tooley, Brigham, Maass, & Bothwell, 1987). It is possible that 
the presence of a weapon causes an interaction of two variables—narrowed attention to 
the weapon due to fear of the object and narrowed attention due to it causing high 
arousal—and this interaction is what “maximizes” the effect of selective encoding 
(Steblay, 1992). A real-life encounter with a weapon during a crime will likely produce 
high levels of arousal that will accelerate the narrowing of perceptive fields to the object 
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that is most important in the environment—the weapon (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987; 
Easterbrook, 1959). In the table below of studies analyzed in Steblay (1992), the 
hypothesis that high stress will increase the effect of weapon focus is supported. Steblay 
(1992) shows the greatest weapon focus effect sizes are found in studies that have a gun 
or high levels of witness arousal.  
 
Study Date Effect 
size 
Z Total 
N 
Arousal Mode Weapon Interval 
Bothwell 1991 -.43 -1.11 27 Low Video Gun Same day 
  .00 .00 28 Low Video Knife Same day 
Cutler & Penrod 1988 -.14 -.91 175 Moderate Video Gun Same day 
Cutler et al. 1987a .29 1.32 165 Moderate Video Gun Delay 
Cutler et al. 1987b .04 .34 290 Moderate Video Gun Delay 
Cutler et al. 1986 .00 .00 320 Moderate Video Gun Same day 
  .23 1.93 287 Moderate Video Gun Delay 
Johnson & Scott 1976 .35 1.21 48 High Staged Opener — 
Kramer 1990 .04 .16 62 Low Slides Cleaver Same day 
Kramer et al. 1990 .61 1.64 64 Moderate Slides Bottle Same day 
  .06 .25 64 Low Slides Cleaver Same day 
  .00 .00 32 Low Slides Cleaver Same day 
  .43 1.50 48 Low Slides Cleaver Same day 
  -.12 -.38 42 Low Slides Cleaver Same day 
Loftus et al. 1987 .67 1.93 36 Moderate Slides Gun Same day 
  .47 2.06 80 Moderate Slides Gun Same day 
Maass & 
Kohnken 
1989 .43 1.96 86 High Staged Syringe Same day 
O’Rourke et al. 1989 .22 1.28 132 Moderate Video Gun Delay 
Tooley et al. 1987 .08 1.65 96 Moderate Slides Gun Same day 
 
Certain factors can increase the weapon focus effect. Pickel (1999) found that if 
the weapon is unexpected or surprising, there is greater memory disruption in the 
witness. Pickel asked individuals to watch videos of a man interacting with a woman. 
The man carried either a gun or a neutral object. There was no effect of the gun in 
situations where one was expected or normal (e.g. a shooting range or one being carried 
Table 7. A meta-analysis of weapon-focus studies from Steblay (1992). Studies with substantial effect sizes are those 
with high levels of arousal or a threatening object (including a gun), confirming the hypothesis that both high levels of 
witness stress and threatening objects contribute to the memory corruption associated with weapon focus. 
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by a police officer), but witnesses were significantly worse at describing the man in 
situations where the gun was unexpected (e.g. if the man and woman were at a baseball 
field or the man was a dressed as a priest). 
Furthermore, Shaw and Skolnick (1999) found that attention was diverted away 
from a confederate’s face if the confederate carried an unusual or salient object. When 
the salient object was a gun, the effect was more substantial. The findings in Shaw and 
Skolnick support those in Mitchell, Livosky, and Mather (1998) where it was found that 
both weapons and novel or unusual objects would distract witnesses and negatively 
affect their ability to remember faces of the people carrying said objects. Mitchell, 
Livosky, and Mather suggest that the “weapon focus effect may be a misnomer for a 
more general attention effect” for salient and unusual objects.  However, Shaw and 
Skolnick (1999) suggest that the presence of a weapon reduces identification accuracy 
more than other unusual objects. Overall, the findings in Pickel (1999), Shaw and 
Skolnick (1999) and Mitchell, Livosky, and Mather (1998) imply that unexpected or 
unusual objects will draw attention because witnesses are not prepared for them and that 
a threatening object will exacerbate this effect, perhaps through increasing stress.  
The police study, Hope et al. (2016), found an exceptional level of memory 
corruption when it came to weapon-related information compared to other details. The 
captor in the hostage situation had a clearly visible weapon that remained in the 
waistband of their pants for the entirety of all trials. Thirty-three of the thirty-nine active 
officers (85%) discharged their weapons during the simulation, with 18% falsely 
recalling that the perpetrator pointed their weapon at them. Additionally, 15% of the 
Active Officers and 22% of the Observer Officers falsely reported seeing the gun in the 
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hands of the perpetrator. Although there was no weapon-absent group for comparison in 
this study, the level of memory inaccuracy for weapon-related information is substantial 
enough to warrant note. 
While the previously discussed weapon focus articles show an effect on episodic 
visual memory, it seems to only affect witness’ retention of auditory information under 
specific circumstances (see: Working Memory section). Pickel, French, and Betts (2003) 
found that the presence of a weapon did not affect the retention of vocal characteristics 
such as a target’s vocal pitch, loudness, or speech rate as long as the auditory 
information was easy to understand. The presence of a weapon only worsened memory 
in situations where the auditory information contained semantic information that was 
difficult to comprehend. This is because there are different working memory stores for 
auditory and visual memory (see: Working memory section). 
Caveats and additional discussion. Hosch, Leippe, Marchioni, and Cooper 
(1984) and Hosch and Cooper (1982) both found null attentional effects in their studies, 
appearing to contradict other literature on narrowed attention. In both studies they found 
that victim-witnesses were not better at recognizing a thief than bystander-witnesses 
even though their increased stake in the crime (their belongings being stolen) caused 
them to pay more attention to it. Additionally, one might expect that victim-witnesses in 
these studies would have their attention narrow to the face of the perpetrator since there 
was no weapon nor threat of bodily harm to draw their attention to other details. 
However, researchers did not find that hypothesized result to be true. After obtaining 
their null results, Hosch and Cooper speculated that even though the victim-witnesses 
likely had heightened attention to the crime compared to the other witnesses, the effects 
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of that heightened attention may have been diminished by the stress and arousal 
associated with being a victim even if that stress was not high. Narby, Cutler and 
Penrod (1996) agreed with Hosch and Cooper that their data had been confounded by 
victim-witness stress since Hosch and Cooper did not measure anxiety or stress levels in 
their participants. 
Attention to central information. There is some evidence that eyewitnesses are 
able to accurately and reliably recall central details of an event. The hypothesis for 
increased recall of central details is based off of narrowing of attention studies; in 
theory, if attention is narrowed to a certain aspect of an event, a witness has a better 
chance of remembering it. What is considered a “central detail” compared to a 
“peripheral detail” is not universally defined, but there are some similarities across 
studies. The table below shows the studies that will be discussed in this section 
pertaining to recall of central versus peripheral information. The general results show 
that actions of people are usually remembered while details about perpetrator 
appearance are forgotten. 
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Researcher Type Witness Stressor Brief findings 
Kuehn (1974) Field Victims of 
crimes 
Being an actual 
victim 
Details of perpetrator appearance 
were the least-reported and most 
misremembered detail 
Christianson & Loftus 
(1987) 
Lab Civilians Traumatic image 
slides 
Participants remembered key 
information about traumatic 
images over time better than non-
traumatic images  
Christianson & Loftus 
(1990) 
Lab Civilians Recall of 
participants’ 
most traumatic 
memory 
Participants believed they recalled 
more central details than peripheral 
ones 
Christianson (1992) Meta-
analysis 
Varies Varies Emotional or traumatic events are 
well-retained over time 
Christianson & 
Hubinette (1993) 
Field Real 
witnesses 
of a crime 
Being present 
during a bank 
robbery 
Recall of central details was more 
accurate than peripheral details 
Stanny & Johnson 
exp. 1 (2000) 
Lab Police Armed suspect 
with hostage 
Perpetrator details were the least 
remembered; actions, victim, and 
weapon details most remembered  
Stanny & Johnson, 
exp. 2 (2000) 
Lab Police, 
Civilians 
Armed suspect 
with hostage or 
in an argument 
Perpetrator details were the least 
remembered; actions, victim, and 
weapon details most remembered 
Deffenbacher, 
Bornstein, Penrod, & 
McGorty (2004)  
Meta-
analysis 
Varies Varies High-stress more likely 
“debilitate” memory for human 
face; results not likely to be 
overturned 
Table 8. The studies discussed in this section that pertain to attention to central 
information. 
 
Field studies. Christianson and Hubinette (1993; see: Decreased encoding, 
discussion section) found that for both victim and bystander groups, memories of 
peripheral details (e.g. date and time) of the robbery were less accurate than details 
directly related to the emotionally arousing event itself (e.g. actions and weapons). Data 
were taken from the statements of 58 victims and bystanders of 22 separate post office 
robberies which were compared to police reports for accuracy. 
In a meta-analysis, Christianson (1992) hypothesized that the victim versus 
bystander recall results reported by Christianson and Hubinette (1993)—which was in 
press at the time—were a result of “flashbulb memories” formed in the minds of the 
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victims. Flashbulb memories are extremely “vivid” memories of an event and the 
circumstances surrounding it; they are formed when an event is “very surprising and 
consequential (or emotionally arousing)” (Brown & Kulik, 1977). Flashbulb memories 
“and other studies of real-life events suggest that highly emotional or traumatic events 
are very well retained over time, especially…detailed information directly associated to 
the traumatic event” (Christianson, 1992). 
Lab studies. Christianson and Loftus (1987) studied recall of traumatic 
memories using image slides to simulate the emotional distress witnesses may 
experience. They found that people could remember the “essence” or “theme” of 
traumatic memories remarkably well, but had impaired memory for both specific and 
peripheral details of the traumatic event. They tested this by presenting participants with 
three “phases” of slides, with each phase having five image slides. Phase one and three 
were neutral events and were identical between the traumatic-slide group and the 
neutral group. Phase two was where the two groups differed. In the traumatic group, the 
phase two slides showed a young boy getting hit by a taxi cab and lying on the hood of 
the car, bleeding profusely from one eye. In the neutral group, phase two slides showed 
a young boy catching a taxi with his mother and going to school. 
Christianson and Loftus (1987) did not explicitly define what a central or 
peripheral detail was before the start of the study, but did notice that there was better 
retention over time for the “distinguishing characteristics” of the traumatic scenario 
(e.g. “blood,” “eye injury,” “taxi”) compared to the neutral scenario. In a follow-up 
experiment, researchers determined that the results in the original slide study were not 
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due to the words themselves being more memorable; the details of the traumatic event 
were more memorable, likely due to the level of emotional arousal in the witness.  
Similarly, Christianson and Loftus (1990) concluded that high emotional 
intensity, like the kind that would occur in a serious crime, correlates with “relatively” 
accurate recall for central details, but “relatively” inaccurate recall for the peripheral 
details of the event. Also, the more emotionally intense the event, the more participants 
believed that that they were remembering central details. 
The data in Christianson and Loftus (1990) was gathered though the use of 
questionnaires. They asked participants to report details of their most traumatic memory 
and rate the emotional intensity. Like Christianson and Loftus (1987), there were no 
pre-defined criteria for what made a detail central or peripheral. They left it up to the 
witness to categorize the type of detail they remembered. Researchers did not share 
what proportion of the reported details were about actions, weapons, facial features, 
feelings, etc., only whether or not the participant believed them to be central or 
peripheral to their traumatic event.  
Caveats and additional discussion. There are obvious problems with a few of 
the studies used as evidence for this proposed effect of increased recall for central 
information. In Christianson and Loftus (1990), data were gathered using 
questionnaires; there was no way to determine how psychologically traumatic one 
person’s event was in comparison to another person’s event. They even cite an instance 
where one person in their study described the death of a parent as being an 11, the 
highest level of trauma possible, while another described being robbed as a 7 because, 
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regardless of how traumatic it felt at the time, she understood that the events could have 
been significantly worse and more traumatic for her. 
Christianson and Loftus (1990) has another issue and it is a problem also found 
in Christianson and Hubinette (1993). The inherent problem with both flashbulb 
memory studies and studies of real-life events is that there is no baseline measure for 
comparison or a way to measure the accuracy of the details witnesses report 
remembering (Christianson, 1992).  
Christianson (1992) is a meta-analysis that found that stress improved memory 
functioning, especially for central details. It included all of the studies mentioned in this 
section in their data. However, the problem with Christianson, or any of these central 
versus peripheral detail studies, is that there is no definition of a central detail and, more 
importantly, there is no discussion on how to classify a perpetrator’s facial features—
which are critical for an identification. 
As shown by Stanny and Johnson (2000) and Kuehn (1974), the details of a 
perpetrator’s face are simply not important enough to be encoded during times of 
extreme stress and fear. Across studies, the focus of stressed witnesses is drawn to 
information that is pertinent to their immediate well-being or the well-being of others. 
This includes things such as the actions of a perpetrator, the weapon used (if one was 
present) and, for police, information about the well-being of the victim (Stanny & 
Johnson, 2000; Christianson & Hubinette, 1993). In fact, memory of perpetrator details 
was the least remembered type of detail in Kuehn (1974) and in both experiments of 
Stanny and Johnson (2000). Kuehn found exceptionally bad recall for perpetrator 
descriptions when it came to hair color, eye color and, in violent crimes, race. Memory 
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of those key distinguishing features is necessary to make an accurate eyewitness 
identification. I argue that, although details of a perpetrator’s face are important for an 
investigation, it is not information that will protect a witness during a crime (unlike 
information about a perpetrator’s actions or weapon); therefore, a perpetrator’s 
appearance should be categorized as a “peripheral detail” and the possible effect of 
increased attention will not apply to it. 
Deffenbacher and his colleagues (2004) examined the studies that comprised 
Christianson’s (1992) meta-analysis. They determined that the procedures used in the 
studies in Christianson’s meta-analysis were unintentionally generating an “orienting 
response” in their witnesses instead of a “defensive response.” An orienting response 
occurs when a person reacts to a change in their environment and a defensive response 
occurs when a person reacts to potentially threatening stimuli. In a real crime, 
eyewitnesses will likely experience a defensive response, so studies eliciting that 
defensive response are what should be examined. Additionally, Cutler (2006) says that 
one downfall of Christianson’s meta-analysis is that it came out before some of the most 
compelling literature on eyewitness stress was published. 
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Amelioration: Accounting for System Variables in Legal Proceedings and 
Best Practices for Police 
Although there is no official courtroom procedure or jury briefing required for 
eyewitness testimony nationwide, North Carolina, Minnesota and Wisconsin all have 
updated their police procedures to include double-blind line-ups and confidence 
statements during the identification process (The Justice Project, 2007). Double-blind 
line-ups are when neither the witness nor the line-up administrator know who the 
suspect is, reducing the possibility that the administrator will intentionally (or 
unintentionally) push a witness toward picking a certain suspect. Confidence statements 
are explanations given by witnesses after choosing someone out of a line-up; witnesses 
describe the level of confidence they have in their identification being accurate. Also, 
police now make disclaimers at certain points in the identification process (e.g. “The 
suspect may or may not be in the line-up.”) to reduce pressure on the witness in order to 
cut down on false identifications. 
Certain groups within the legal system (particularly defense attorneys) are 
extremely likely to hold the belief that eyewitnesses are often inaccurate due to 
estimator variables and then challenge the legitimacy of eyewitness evidence in court 
(Brigham & WolfsKeil, 1983). Although the above police practices will not cut down 
on challenges of admissibility based on situational factors during a crime, following 
these procedures will make a judge less likely to throw out eyewitness evidence due to 
police error or misconduct after an attorney questions the handling of an eyewitness. 
In addition to understanding the system variables that can affect an eyewitness, 
police can benefit from knowing the literature on stress as an estimator variable. For 
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example: If police are given two witnesses, one close to an armed perpetrator and 
another further away, it would save them time and resources to know what kind of 
information to pursue with each witness. With the witness close to the armed 
perpetrator, police should focus on weapon-related questions while being extremely 
wary of any perpetrator descriptions given by the witness. This is because attention 
would narrow to the weapon (i.e., the weapon focus effect) and extreme levels of stress 
caused by weapon and by being in close proximity to the perpetrator would degrade 
memory for perpetrator descriptions. With the witness that was further away, police can 
better-trust reported perpetrator descriptions since the lack of proximity to the weapon 
and to the perpetrator would cause that witness to have less stress compared to the one 
who was closer. 
Court Cases 
Oregon and New Jersey both considered the current work on eyewitness 
unreliability and have changed courtroom policy. Both State v. Lawson/James (2012) 
and State v. Henderson (2011) outlined stricter protocols for handling eyewitnesses in 
order to cut down on misidentifications caused by system variables. Amongst other 
things, police can only show photo-spreads in particular ways and at particular times to 
prevent an innocent face from being ingrained into a witness’ memory. Also, they are 
required to ask for confidence ratings after each witness identification. 
With State v. Henderson (2011), the New Jersey Supreme Court revamped their 
state’s protocol on admitting eyewitness evidence. There are now more than a dozen 
factors that need to be considered before admitting eyewitness testimony, including 
things such as: the line-up being conducted using a double-blind procedure, the duration 
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of the crime, lighting during the incident, how stressed the witness was during the 
event, and if the witness is attempting a cross-racial identification. Additionally, if 
“disputed evidence” is admitted into the courtroom, the judge has to brief jurors—in the 
middle of a trial—on the factors that could lead an eyewitness to make an inaccurate 
identification (Weiser, 2011). 
The Oregon Supreme Court published their verdict in State v. Lawson/James 
(2012), a unanimous, consolidated opinion on two cases that primarily hinged on 
eyewitness testimony. State v. Lawson/James reformed previous eyewitness policy that 
had been established in State v. Classen (1979). In Lawson/James, the Court outlines 
the importance of evaluating estimator variables (specifically witness stress, viewing 
conditions, and exposure time to the perpetrator) before determining the reliability of 
the witness. The court then shifted the burden of responsibility to the prosecutor to 
prove that the witness is reliable instead of having the jury discern witness credibility 
once the witness was on the stand. With Lawson/James, the prosecutor has to prove to a 
judge that the witness is credible and the judge determines whether or not that witness’ 
testimony will be allowed in the courtroom. 
Even though both State v. Lawson/James and State v. Henderson list stress as a 
factor that needs to be considered before admitting eyewitness evidence, there is no 
guide for judges on how to determine if a witness was stressed nor is there a guide 
delineating all of the factors that can cause witness stress. As discussed throughout this 
paper, stress can be elicited through visually perceptible (e.g. weapon presence, 
physical violence) and non-perceptible means (e.g. for women—the potential threat of 
being raped; for officers—the potential threat of scrutiny by superiors). State v. 
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Lawson/James and State v. Henderson are steps in the right direction, but those in the 
judicial sphere should be equipped with better, up-to-date information on the relation of 
stress to other variables and effects of stress in all of those cases. 
Remaining problems. Although the aforementioned changes in courtroom and 
police procedures are positive, they primarily focus on system variables and do not have 
a clear, concise way of handling and evaluating relevant estimator variables. Dr. Brian 
Cutler, a specialist in eyewitness research and former editor-in-chief of Law and Human 
Behavior, wrote that there are a few estimator variables that are reliable predictors of 
identification accuracy: own-race bias, exposure duration, masking of hair and hairline 
cues, weapon focus, eyewitness stress, and the passage of time (Cutler, 2006). In legal 
proceedings, eyewitness evaluations should have these specific factors examined—
although Cutler qualifies that any of the effects of these estimator variables can be 
altered by other factors. However, similar to what was described with stress in State v. 
Lawson/James (2012) and State v. Henderson (2011), there is no guide for law 
enforcement on how and to what extent various estimator variables can affect 
eyewitnesses, just that there is an effect. 
Another problem is that the stress-memory data that exists are relatively recent. 
Fifteen years ago, a survey of opinions of researchers in psychology showed that 81-
90% of psychologists believed that data on weapon focus, own-race bias, exposure 
duration, and passage of time were all reliable enough to present as expert testimony in 
a court, but only 50% of them believed that the information on stress was reliable 
enough to present as expert testimony (Cutler, 2006; Kassin, Tubb, Hosch & Memon, 
2001). The 2001 survey came out before the publishing of some of the most influential 
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stress-memory articles in the field. Specifically, Cutler singles out the meta-analysis of 
Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, and McGorty (2004) and the military study Morgan et 
al. (2004) as having “compelling evidence” and believes that those studies would have 
greatly altered the results of Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, and Memon’s 2001 survey (Cutler, 
2006). The field of psychology needs a more recent survey of expert opinions on stress 
in order to convince those in the criminal justice and legal system that policy changes 
need to be implemented. 
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Conclusion 
 There is strong evidence that stress negatively impacts eyewitness memory. 
High stress disrupts memory encoding and also causes attention to narrow, limiting the 
amount of information being accurately stored. In field and video studies, there was a 
strong trend of witnesses performing worse in the violent (i.e., high stress) condition 
compared to the neutral one. High stress levels in witnesses are typically caused by fear.  
In stressful conditions, peripheral details of the event (such as perpetrator 
details) were the least-remembered piece of information while distinguishing 
characteristics that are important to the witness at the time of the event (such as 
information about the weapon and the actions of the perpetrator) were the most-
remembered type of information. Furthermore, if there is a weapon or threatening object 
present, attention is drawn to it and the ability to recall information about other details 
goes down—especially if the weapon is unexpected or surprising. If the weapon is 
expected, like at a gun range, the effects of narrowed attention to the weapon are 
diminished. 
Additionally, there is some evidence for increased attention to central details due 
to a narrowing of attention as stress increases, but more research is needed on how 
accurate those memories are and if they change over time. Also, it is likely that the 
effect of increased recall ability that is associated with increased attention would not 
apply to eyewitness identifications since a perpetrator’s face likely qualifies as a 
“peripheral detail.” Either way, understanding how various factors affect stress and 
eyewitness recall will allow the criminal justice system to account for and predict the 
type of errors a witness may make. 
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   Finally, although there have been strides in the criminal justice system with 
handling eyewitness evidence, improvements need to be made. Not only do more states 
need to adopt courtroom policy like Oregon and New Jersey did with State v. 
Lawson/James (2012) and State v. Henderson (2011), but Lawson/James and 
Henderson can still be improved. Both could benefit from clearer explanations of stress 
and its effects under specific circumstances as well as factors that can contribute to 
witness stress. Police officers can also benefit from understanding social science 
literature. Understanding what lines of questioning are likely to produce useful 
information instead of no information (or worse, misinformation) based on the 
situational factors that the witness experienced during the crime can save them 
important time and resources in the long-run. 
 Despite more research being needed in a few areas of eyewitness stress and 
memory, the current evidence of stress’ negative effect on memory performance is 
overwhelming and convincing. Knowing that, there should be a push for reform in the 
criminal justice sector in order to minimize the amount eyewitness misinformation 
being used in the legal system. 
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